Recently, I have been writing a lot about the geopolitical split in the Middle East, especially between the Arab countries of the Arab League, and the recent apparent phenomenon of camps-forming in the Middle East. This is a developing regional reality, which is getting clearer over time and with the region’s crises and current developments. Gaza crisis, as I previously pointed out, well contributed to exposing this regional geopolitical reality.

In this regard, the major exposure or aspect of this geopolitical reality, in my opinion, was the comprehensive, severe, and deliberate attack on Egypt by the Iranian or extremist camp in the region, which constituted a serious concerted campaign against Egypt in particular, and the moderate Arab countries in general. Given the seriousness, severity and the wide unprecedented extent of this campaign, I considered this Iranian public campaign then as almost a war declaration on the Arab moderate camp and the Arab moderation concerning the region’s affairs and issues.

As this Iranian campaign during and even after Gaza crisis broke the implicit norms, considerations and somewhat the common sense of inter-regional public relations between the various regional regimes and governments applied particularly since the end of the Gulf war II, I expected that there would be some reaction to this new Iranian regional approach and policy by the affected Arab parties, or at least a change in those parties’ approach on the Iranian behavior and interventions in the region.

In fact, the nature of the Iranian role and the associated roles of other regional parties, affiliated with Iran under the Iranian extremist camp, necessitates such reaction or counter-policy, as the recent Iranian behavior has become threatening of the national security of each party affected by this behavior and the general Arab national security and interests.

In this regard, there is actually a significant change in Egypt’s rhetoric and official statements on Iran and the parties of the Iranian regional camp, particularly Hezbulla and the Syrian Baath regime, which are active parties of the campaign against Egypt. These new rhetoric and official statements have become more candid and attacking Iran and those affiliated parties.

Saudi Arabia, in its turn, is, to a lesser extent, following this approach. In this regard, in the latest days, there were actually some harsh and direct statements by some Egyptian officials, especially the foreign minister, attacking Iran and Hezbullah. Moreover, there were also some indirect Saudi statements intending Iran, attacking and warning of the regional foreign intervention in the Arab questions and the Arab region.

Then, at this stage, the question is that would the new rhetoric by the leading Arab moderate powers be followed by related new policies in this regard?