A few days ago, Hamas, which is controlling Gaza strip by de facto force, decided to end the truce with Israel in Gaza. Shortly afterwards, Israel has started a major military operation in Gaza strip. The target of this Israeli operation, as announced by the Israeli government, is the Hamas control of Gaza, and by other official statements, Hamas itself, to stop eventually the rockets aimed at the Israeli territories according to the Israeli government.

The Israeli Gaza military operation is restricted to air strikes so far. These strikes target all military facilities and security centers belonging to Hamas or used by it, including the official buildings of the Palestinian National Authority like the interior ministry. The Palestinian casualties of these strikes were some hundreds with a death toll of about 300, including about 50 civilians according to the U.N. until the third day of the operation.

To extract the political effects and implications of this operation, we, first of all, should match the declared official goal by the Israeli government to the realities of the military actions on the ground. Then, we can find no obvious contradictions at this stage given the ambiguity of the Israeli declared goal of this operation so far.

In fact, there is some doubt about the ability of this operation to destroy Hamas as an organization. In addition, there is an uncertainty about ending the Hamas control of Gaza strip. In this regard, what is a certain consequence of this operation is the serious damage to Hamas, as an organization, and to its control of Gaza and its strength there.

These realities pose a very important and essential question about the future governing of Gaza after this operation. Then, if this operation achieved the goal of ending the Hamas control of Gaza, who would control the strip afterwards? Does the Palestinian government have the required ability and necessary means to extend its authority to Gaza strip? What are the prospective consequences of the destruction of the security infrastructure in the strip for the post-operation control of Gaza? What if Hamas accepted a truce or a permanent ceasefire in Gaza, would Israel, Palestinian Authority and Arab countries accept Hamas keeping its control of Gaza?

Therefore, at first, Israel should define the goal of its Gaza operation in political terms. In fact, it is time for politics to conceive the exit way, which is definitely of political nature. In this regard, Israel should clearly realize the indispensability of the Palestinian Authority’s role in settling this question, and the latter should immediately start negotiating with Israel and other concerned parties to restore its authority in Gaza strip, backed by the Arab countries, especially the key countries of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and in coordination with them.

In my opinion, any political result of this operation is less than a permanent ceasefire in Gaza along with full restoration of normal conditions there under the authority of the Palestinian government, would be nothing but a failure to Israeli and Palestinian parties in addition to regional moderate Arab parties.